Observation of current international events leads us to recognise that concerns about the gradual erosion of the principles on which a world order - established since 1945 to prevent a repetition of the horrors of the two world wars - appear, unfortunately, to be justified by a series of recent events.
Starting from the two main crisis areas, the Middle East and Russia/Ukraine, it is certainly true that in the former the dramatic conflict of the past months has taken on lesser dimensions. However, this does not mean that it can be considered definitively over, in the absence of a precise timetable on the reconstruction of the territories (first and foremost the Gaza Strip), the disarmament of Hamas and the withdrawal of the Israeli army and, above all, on the stages of implementation of that system of 'two peoples and two states'. This, in the most far-sighted political assessments appears to be the only solution likely to lead Israelis and Palestinians to the much-longed-for condition of lasting peace.
In the second case, fighting on the ground and attacks on Ukrainian cities by Russian missiles and drones continue largely unabated in a conflict that is now approaching its fifth year—a period longer, by way of comparison, than the war between Nazi Germany and the then Soviet Union, which lasted from 1941 to 1945.
The efforts of the international community, with the active (though often discordant) participation of the United States and the European countries, united in the so-called “coalition of the willing,” are particularly focused on addressing what are likely the two most challenging aspects of the post-conflict architecture. These issues concern, on the one hand, the identification of Ukrainian “regions” that might be assigned to the Russian Federation under a future negotiated arrangement and, on the other, the security guarantees to be extended to Kyiv in order to prevent future territorial or other claims by Moscow against its neighbour. Although the channels of dialogue between President Putin's negotiators and their 'Western' counterparts remain open - a factor, the latter, certainly positive and important - the road ahead still appears long and strewn with obstacles.
By further broadening the scope of analysis, many of those conflicts that could be described as “regional in nature” remain unresolved. These have been included by the relevant United Nations agencies in a long list comprising around fifty distinct crisis areas. For some of them (such as, for example, the China-Pakistan dispute), any “local” label is in fact far too restrictive, given the obviously much broader geopolitical implications involved. The list would, of course, be incomplete without Iran, where the situation resembles a powder keg ready to explode, underscoring the severity of the ongoing clashes between anti-government protesters and the Ayatollah regime’s repressive police forces. If, as some sources suggest, “external actors” were compelled to intervene in turn, we would be confronted with an escalation that would be difficult to contain.
For some weeks now, following the U.S. military intervention, Venezuela has also become one of the most acute crisis cases. The events of 3 January, culminating in what some have described as the “kidnapping” of President Maduro and his forcible transfer to Washington to face narco‑terrorism charges in a US court, have been interpreted in widely varying (and, inevitably, highly contested) ways by governments, political analysts and the global media. From our perspective, in commenting briefly on the Stars and Stripes military “blitz,” we express deep concern over the persistent erosion of core inter-state principles (sovereignty, inviolable borders, and non-interference in internal affairs), upheld since the Second World War.
In fact, the inevitable corollary of such arbitrary power - the dominance of the strongest - appears destined, unfortunately, to solidify in international relations: the explicit triumph of arms over diplomacy, a scenario the founders of the United Nations sought to prevent at all costs through the creation of a multilateral system centred on the “Glass Palace”. Aligned with the United States, their withdrawal during President Trump’s second term from 66 international organisations - including half linked to the United Nations - stands out as particularly emblematic.
I am, however, of the opinion that the discouraging analysis conducted so far should not prevent us from recognising the emergence (or confirmation of the existence) of some 'light' on the international scene, demonstrating that democracies, when grounded in solid principles of credibility and cooperation, can generate effective “antibodies” against the rise of illiberal and anti-democratic threats.
In this spirit, I would like to briefly highlight the 'virtuous behaviour' in which some members of the community of states distinguished themselves during 2025, deliberately excluding from this ranking the members of the European Union.
I would certainly include Canada in this list, given its success in resisting the various pressures exerted by its powerful southern neighbour, without resorting to provocations or populist responses, thanks in part to the efforts of its new Prime Minister, Mark Carney. I would also highlight Moldova, whose citizens have rejected the enticements of more nationalist political forces, opting in recent elections for a path of closer alignment with Europe. A special mention also goes to South Korea. One year ago it was threatened by an authoritarian president with repressive measures such as the imposition of martial law and the closure of parliament, and now, thanks to the massive mobilisation of its population, it is fully back on the democratic path. South America offers the example of Brazil, a country that has in turn been able to ensure respect for the results of the ballot box, distancing itself from attempts to subvert the established order, and also implementing an effective policy to defend the Amazon forest. Still on the same continent and limited to the economic realm, Argentina merits recognition for sharply reducing inflation (211% → 30%), cutting poverty by 21 points in 2024, and advancing a well-established path of economic liberalisation.
The hope, which I believe is widely shared, is that over the course of 2026 additional countries, including those from regions with higher risk profiles, may justifiably aspire to be added to this list. According to qualified observers, Syria could be a potential new entrant. Following the removal of Bashar al-Assad, it has demonstrated over the past year tangible signs of cooperation with the United States, Europe, and its regional neighbours. An approach that will hopefully set a positive precedent for others.
Reggente Marco Marsilli, Foundation President
